Bad Pop Science

Like many people who argue for atheism and think independently, I love science. When I went to a science fiction convention last year, on one day I attended almost nothing but panels about science itself. One of the things that was brought up was bad science being reported to the press. They mentioned that professional science writers who have bona fide scientific training have largely gone by the wayside as newspapers and other news media outlets cut budgets.

You might have seen some online yourself, where reporters, perhaps due to scientific incompetence, unintentionally or otherwise exaggerate real scientific accomplishments into headlines that grab your attention (probably not coincidentally, sucking in readers to read the article means more eyeballs on advertisements, which means more profits for those who host the articles). Epidemiologist and science writer Ben Goldacre write about

…the media obsession with "new breakthroughs": a more subtly destructive category of science story. It's quite understandable that newspapers should feel it's their job to write about new stuff. But in the aggregate, these stories sell the idea that science, and indeed the whole empirical world view, is only about tenuous, new, hotly-contested data. Articles about robustly-supported emerging themes and ideas would be more stimulating, of course, than most single experimental results, and these themes are, most people would agree, the real developments in science. But they emerge over months and several bits of evidence, not single rejiggable press releases. Often, a front page science story will emerge from a press release alone, and the formal academic paper may never appear, or appear much later, and then not even show what the press reports claimed it would

This was written back in 2005, but what he said holds true years later. Here’s an example of one of the things that was brought up by an audience member in the panel, an article written in 2010 titled Freaky Physics Proves Parallel Universes Exist. Seldom (if ever!) have I seen such an attention grabbing headline for a science article (I can almost hear the cha-ching resulting from the numerous people who clicked to read the article), but was there freaky physics that proved parallel universes exist? No, not even close. From a Science Blogs article titled The Worst Physics Article Ever:

Every word in the title is wrong but “physics”. It’s not freaky, doesn’t prove anything we didn’t already know, and has nothing to do with parallel universes nor does it shed any light the question of their possible existence.

Science Blogs, incidentally, is a good place for real science news because it’s an invitation only group that’s written by bona fide scientists, not scientifically illiterate journalists.

Another example I’ve seen posted by some folks online is an article titled, “Cambridge Study Reveals How Life Could Have Started From Nothing.” The title reminds me of the time that David Z. Albert (author of Quantum Mechanics and Experience, a book I read to happily learn more about the concepts of quantum mechanics) criticized his fellow physicist Lawrence Krauss on his use of “nothing”(and other philosophical missteps) in the book A Universe from Nothing in the New York Times. The afterward of Krauss’s book, authored by Richard Dawkins, says, “Even the last remaining trump card of the theologian, ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?,’ shrivels up before your eyes as you read these pages.” But as Albert explained, the book fails completely in doing this. (I have already put forward a better way to rebut the Leibnizian cosmological argument). In Krauss’s defense, he has a doctorate in physics but not philosophy (whereas Albert has doctorates in both) and Krauss at least made it clear what he meant by “nothing.” Krauss can be forgiven for not being as philosophically literate as Albert, but at least Krauss was scientifically literate. The author of this article doesn’t show literacy in either field in claiming that the scientific discovery he refers to shows that life could come from nothing.

I might be nitpicking about “nothing,” but the author of the article does say, “Rasler's team has been the first to show that life could literally come from nothing.” If nothing else, don’t use misuse the word “literally.” Such misuse drives me figuratively insane.

From the article:

One of the most challenging questions in basic biology and the history of evolution and life stems from the unknown origin of the first cells billions of years ago. Though many pieces of the puzzle have been put together, this origin story remains somewhat murky. But a team of researchers from the University of Cambridge believe they've accidentally stumbled on an answer, and a very compelling one at that.

The mistakes of this article aren’t as serious as the “Freaky Physics Proves Parallel Universes Exist” but apparently the article has misled a number of people on the internet into thinking the discovery is a lot bigger than it is.

When you see fantastic claims like “[Someone or some team] has been the first to show that life could literally come from nothing,” it’s often a good idea to check the original scientific paper if you can (at least its abstract). It won’t necessarily always be comprehensible to a layperson (even a scientifically literate one), but this time we’re fortunate. From first few sentences of the abstract, with some key parts bolded:

The reaction sequences of central metabolism, glycolysis and the pentose phosphate pathway provide essential precursors for nucleic acids, amino acids and lipids. However, their evolutionary origins are not yet understood. Here, we provide evidence that their structure could have been fundamentally shaped by the general chemical environments in earth's earliest oceans.

I’m not going to say this isn’t progress, but notice what was accomplished here is a lot more modest then the impression made in the pop science article—or at least portions of it. The article does add the caveat that this discovery is “one that is still only a part of an overall picture that's still forming through years of continuing research,” but that’s still no reason to use a misleading headline and inaccurately describe the science as “Rasler's team has been the first to show that life could literally come from nothing.” The actual accomplishment of Rasler’s team wasn’t anything close to that.

There are numerous other examples I could give, but I think something more useful would be looking at this TED talk by Ben Goldacre about battling bad science. Not only does he have a charming British accent, he also has useful stuff to say. One of the things he does is what I did in my “life from nothing” example: he looked up the actual paper.

He also talks about pharmaceutical industries withholding scientific studies, but fortunately that situation seems to be improving somewhat.

Conjunction of Contingent Facts

One variety of the Leibnizian cosmological argument (LCA) is one in which the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) is “every fact has an explanation for why it is true.” A fact being contingent means it could have been false. An example of a contingent fact is “Abraham Lincoln was the President of the United States.” An example of a non-contingent fact is “two plus two equal four.” Behold the following argument for theism:

1. There is an sufficient reason (and thus an explanation) for every contingent fact (PSR).
2. The conjunction of all contingent facts (fact #1 is true and fact #2 is true and...) is itself a fact; call this CCF.
3. CCF is a contingent fact (surely a different conjunction is possible, since each fact is contingent).
4. CCF has an explanation (follows from 1 and 3).
5. If CCF has an explanation, that explanation is a necessary entity (it cannot be another contingent thing since that would be part of CCF, the very thing we are trying to explain, and contingent facts cannot themselves contain the reason for why they are true).
6. Therefore, there exists a necessary entity that is the explanation for CCF (follows from 4 and 5).

One of God’s classical attributes is necessary existence, i.e. that he is a being that exists in all possible worlds. And so, the final line, if true, would constitute at least some evidence for theism. Some versions of the LCA have a less modest conclusion, saying something like “Therefore, God exists” but here I’ll address the harder-to-attack version since if line (6) is true and justified by this argument, it would indeed constitute some evidence for theism and atheism is better off showing that line (6) is not justified here.

There is a reason to believe that premise (1) is false, but first, let me praise it a little bit. It is admirable to search for explanations for why some contingent fact is true; science looks for such explanations all the time. The trouble is when we take an idea that’s good in general but then take it to an extreme. The PSR in premise (1) is just such an example.

Suppose it’s true that the CCF has a sufficient reason for why it is that way and not otherwise. If so, that reason would itself have to be some sort of necessary fact; if it were a contingent fact it would be part of CCF, which is what is to be explained, and contingent facts cannot themselves contain the reason for why they are true (note the similar reasoning for this and line 5). But whatever is entailed by a necessary truth is itself necessary, which would make CCF a necessary truth, which of course conflicts with premise (3). So this version of the LCA is not a sound argument. If I had to pick a false premise, I’d say (1) is very likely false.

No One Lives Forever

On this Halloween night I'm reminded of an Oingo Boingo song (for those who don't know, the singer is Danny Elfman!). Here's a clip from their farewell concert:

Why do I show this? One, it is Halloween and the song is somewhat macabre (though not as much as some of their other songs). Two, it kind of addresses a point about life supposedly being meaningless and grim on an atheistic no-afterlife worldview. Some of the lyrics are as follows:

No one beats him at his game
For very long, but just the same
Who cares; there's no place safe to hide
Nowhere to run—no time to cry
So celebrate while you still can
'Cause any second, it may end
And when it's all been said and done
Better that you had some fun
Instead of hiding in a shell
Why make your life a living hell?
So have a toast and down the cup
And drink to bones that turn to dust 'cause
No one, no one, no one, no one, no one, no one, no one, no one, no one, no one, no one, no one
No one lives forever!

Even if there is no afterlife, what he says here is quite true: better that you have some fun, why make your life a living hell? No need to be grim and sad; enjoy life while you can!

Criterion of Embarrassment

Last month I mentioned the “criterion of embarrassment” and how it might not apply so well with the female discoverers of the tomb. The criterion of embarrassment is a bona fide earmark of truth used by historians, but it can also backfire on Christian apologists. I have only one example to give in this article, but it’s a big one: Matthew 27:46 (NIV):

About three in the afternoon Jesus cried out in a loud voice, “Eli, Eli, lema sabachthani?” (which means “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?”).

I’ll agree with the Christian who thinks that the criterion of embarrassment brings significant verisimilitude points here, but it also poses a problem for those who believe Jesus is the incarnation of God. Jesus, being an incarnation of God, would be omniscient and thus would know that this what’s being uttered here isn’t quite true. Moreover, this phrase is far more likely to be uttered if atheism is true and Jesus was not the Son of God, but rather some poor deluded soul. So while I think it’s more likely than not that Jesus uttered this phrase, this would seem to be evidence against Christianity.

Women Visiting Jesus’ Tomb

A number of Christian apologists claim that the women discovering the empty tomb of Jesus brings points in favor of the empty tomb because of the so-called criterion of embarrassment, with women (who were admittedly of a lower social status) being the first witnesses of it. But a person making up this story (not saying it was made up; maybe it was merely legendary) might have included the women just to be realistic. From the Women in the Bible website:

Tombs were visited and watched for three days by family members. On the third day after death, the body was examined. This was to make sure that the person was really dead, for accidental burial of someone still living could occur. On these occasions, the body would be treated by the women of the family with oils and perfumes. The women's visit to the tombs of Jesus and Lazarus are connected with this ritual.

A person knowing this likely would have had the women be the first discoverers of Jesus’ empty tomb.

More Plausible Than Their Denials

Introduction

William Lane Craig has long been a fan of the “more plausible than its denial” approach with premises in pro-theism arguments. In addition to being formally valid (the conclusion logically and inescapably following from the premises), having true premises, being informally valid (making no informal fallacies, like begging the question) Craig seems to think adding “the premises are more plausible than their negations” to this list is enough to make a good argument. Craig’s position on this is problematic however.

The Problem

Take for example this Q & A article. As one might expect, Craig says that among the criteria for a good argument are the argument being deductively valid (the conclusion follows logically and inescapably from the premises) and true premises. (In logic, a deductively valid argument with true premises is called a sound argument.) Craig however also says this:

I’ve argued that what is needed is that the premisses be not only true but more plausible than their opposites or negations. If it is more plausible that a premiss is, in light of the evidence, true rather than false, then we should believe the premiss.

Should we? Consider this hypothetical scenario. I am very sick, and there is a potion that has a 51% chance of curing me if I drink it, but also has a 49% chance of killing me if I drink it. If I don’t take the potion, I will recover in a few days, albeit it will be a rather unpleasant few days, akin to having the flu. Now, if I knew the potion would cure me, the rational thing for me would be to take it. And yet, the rational thing for me to do is to not accept “This potion will cure me” as something I know to be true. We have a claim that is more plausible than its negation, but I’m pretty sure the uncertainty level is great enough that I should withhold my belief in it. So this argument isn’t a good one even though each premise is more plausible than its negation:

1. If drinking the potion would cure me, then I should drink it.
2. Drinking the potion would cure me.
3. Therefore, I should drink it.

Individually each premise is more plausible than its negation, and yet the conclusion isn’t quite true.

Or to use a less dramatic example to illustrate the point, suppose a random number generator has displayed an integer 1 through 20, but I haven’t yet looked at the screen yet to know which number it picked. The claim, “It picked a number less than 12” is more plausible than its negation; it has a 55% of being true, but I don’t really know it to be true until I look at the screen. I would be quite rational in withholding my belief about whether “It picked a number less than 12” is in fact true.

Suppose our random number generator has three trials, with each event being probabilistically independent of the other. Now consider the following deductive argument:

4. The first trial picked a number less than 13.
5. The second trial picked a number less than 13.
6. The third trial picked a number less than 13.
7. Therefore, the first, second, and third trials each picked a number less than 13.

Each premise has a 60% chance of being true, and thus each premise is more plausible than its denial. And yet, the probability that we have a sound argument is only 21.6%, and the probability that the conclusion is false is 78.4%. Yet if we were to follow Craig’s logic, we should believe all three premises (since each is more plausible than its negation), and as a consequent we should believe the conclusion (on pain of inconsistency, since the conclusion follows from the premises) even though we know the conclusion has a 78.4% chance of being false!

Craig seems kind of aware of this problem in the Q & A article I linked to, but he never seems to quite address it. Craig does say, “It’s logically fallacious to multiply the probabilities of the premisses to try to calculate the probability of the conclusion.” But whether that is true will depend on the circumstances. In the case of the random number generator argument, multiplying the probability of the premises to calculate the probability of the conclusion works just fine. Here’s an example where it doesn’t work, where I roll a fair six-sided die but didn’t see the die come up:

8. The six-sided fair die I rolled is four or less.
9. The six-sided fair die I rolled is five or less.
10. Therefore, the six-sided die I rolled is (a) four or less; and (b) five or less.

Multiplying the probabilities gives us about 55.6% probability for the conclusion, when the conclusion’s probability is closer to 66.7%. The reason multiplying probabilities doesn’t work here is that the premises aren’t probabilistically independent of each other.

Still, the random number generator argument I gave (lines 4 through 7 above) still provides an apparent counterexample to Craig’s claim regarding what makes a good argument, because here we have an argument that meets Craig’s criteria and yet we know the argument is probably unsound. We also have reason to doubt Craig’s claim that, “If it is more plausible that a premiss is, in light of the evidence, true rather than false, then we should believe the premiss” due to the argument in lines 1 through 3 above.

A Caveat

I don’t want to go too far and assert that “Each premise is more plausible than its negation” is a worthless criterion. Often times if a deductively valid argument were to meet that criterion, the argument would provide at least some degree of rational support for the conclusion. To illustrate, suppose we knew that each premise of the following argument is more plausible than its denial:

11. If God does not exist, then objective moral values and duties do not exist.
12. Objective moral values and duties do exist.
13. Therefore, God exists.

The fact (if it were so) that each premise is more plausible than its denial would make the atheist intellectually uncomfortable, because each premise being more plausible than its denial means that the argument provides at least some support for the conclusion, and it would just be a question of how much support that argument provides. (For those interested in seeing me argue that it is not the case that each premise is more plausible than its negation, see my article The Moral Argument and William Lane Craig.)

Consider again the case of the random number generator: the argument in lines 4-7. There the argument’s premises are (individually) more plausible than their denial such that we at least know the probability of the conclusion is not less than 21.6%. So each premise being more plausible than its denial lends some support for the conclusion—21.6% is better than 0% after all—it’s just that the degree of rational support is not enough to make the conclusion’s probability more than 50%.

And I think this sort of thing is an often overlooked weakness in pro-theism arguments. It’s possible for a pro-theism argument to provide some but only a little support for the conclusion. Indeed, that was the approach I took when rebutting the Leibnizian cosmological argument where I said this (albeit after bestowing a number of objections to the argument):

One way an argument can fail to be convincing is if it provides no rational support for its conclusion, but we should not make the mistake of thinking that’s the only way an argument can fail to be convincing. Another way is if the argument provided nonzero but nonetheless too little support for its conclusion. So we can accept that ceteris paribus a worldview that explains e.g. why there is something rather than nothing is better than one that doesn’t, but given the plausibility of physical reality existing eternally without an external cause, the degree of evidential support this provides is rather small.

And if the probability of God’s existence is much less than 50% (due to say the argument from evil), the Leibnizian cosmological argument would do very little to remedy that problem for theism.

Beneficial Gene Duplication

I have noticed a number of creationists bringing up this creationist drivel:

No known mutation has ever produced a form of life having greater complexity and viability than its ancestors.

If true, this would indeed be a notable objection, since in the evolution from single-celled organisms to homo sapiens surely some increase in complexity happened along the way. Evolution requires genetic changes that increase genetic information, and at least some of these changes need to be beneficial so that they are chosen by natural selection. What sort of mutation could do that?

Answer: gene duplications. Gene duplications allow for an increase in genetic information, and science has observed beneficial gene duplications in real life. From Evolution after Gene Duplication:

The beneficial impact of gene duplication has been shown for several classes of genes. Perhaps the clearest example of an adaptive increase of gene dosage through a gene is that of the amylase gene in humans. Amylase is secreted in the pancreas and saliva, and it starts digestion in the course of chewing food with a significant portion of starch hydrolysis occurring before food reaches the stomach….the number of copies of the amylase gene was found to be significantly larger among populations with a high-starch diet. In addition, the frequency of individuals with more than six copies was two times higher in high-starch diet populations. Most important, there is a clear interdependence between the number of gene copies and the amount of amylase in saliva.[1]

This is a beneficial gene duplication in human beings. The book also says that, “insecticide resistance through gene duplication has been recognized as a major force by many others”[2] though to avoid giving a false impression I should also quote them saying that an “important aspect of insecticide resistance through gene duplication is that at least some of these duplications are actually deleterious in an environment without the pesticide.”[3] Sometimes in evolution it’s a “you win some, you lose some” sort of situation. A mutation that is on the whole beneficial for the environment you’re in might still come at a price, such as the loss of some beneficial traits. That’s why the theory of evolution isn’t necessarily committed to us retaining all the beneficial traits of our ancestors, such as superior physical strength akin to apes.

NOTES:

---

[1] Katharina Dittmar and David Liberles Evolution after Gene Duplication (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010) pp. 63-64.

[2] Katharina Dittmar and David Liberles Evolution after Gene Duplication (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010) p. 64

[3] Ibid.